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Abstract This paper argues that Ludwik Fleck’s concepts of thought collectives
and proto-ideas are surprisingly topical to tackle some conceptual challenges in
analyzing contemporary innovation. The objective of this paper is twofold: First, it
strives to establish Ludwik Fleck as an important classic on the map of innovation
analysis. A systematic comparison with Thomas Kuhn’s work on paradigms, a
concept highly inﬂuential in various branches of innovation studies, suggests a
number of pronounced yet under-researched advantages of a Fleckian perspective in
the context of technological change and innovation. Secondly, the paper links these
advantages to some recent changes in the organization of innovation. Due to the
rising pervasiveness of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs),
conﬁgurational innovation has become commonplace that cuts across the boundaries
of established trajectories of knowledge generation. Fleck’s graded understanding of
the closedness of thought collectives and his weak notion of incommensurability
provide powerful metaphors to grasp the peculiarities of conﬁgurational innovation.
Keywords Thought style  Paradigm  Ludwik Fleck 
Conﬁgurational technology  Innovation
Introduction
In this paper, I revisit Ludwik Fleck’s work on thought styles and thought
collectives. In Science and Technology Studies (STS), Fleck is well-known for his
‘‘protoconstructivist theory’’ (Smith 2000) that has early anticipated many of the
pivotal tenets of a contemporary understanding of science. With regard to
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DOI 10.1007/s11024-011-9180-4understanding technological change and innovation, however, he has thus far
received only little and also unsystematic attention. This is especially unfortunate
given Thomas Kuhn’s extensive inﬂuence in innovation studies. While Kuhn has
introduced many of his central ideas with explicit reference to Fleck, marked
differences exist between the works of these scholars. In this paper, I discuss these
differences, propose a Fleckian perspective on technological change and innovation
and demonstrate how this perspective can enrich our understanding of contemporary
innovation. In a nutshell, therefore, this paper strives to establish Ludwik Fleck as
an important classic on the map of innovation scholars.
Ininnovationstudies, ithas longbeen claimedthat technologicalchange shouldbe
conceivedasapatternedprocessofknowledgecreation.Inthisregard,notionssuchas
technological paradigms (Dosi 1982; Granberg and Stankiewicz 1981; Johnston
1972), trajectories (Nelson and Winter 1977) or frames (Bijker 1987; Kaplan and
Tripsas 2008) have borrowed from Kuhnian ideas about scientiﬁc progress. I argue
that, useful as these concepts are, they suffer from a strong interpretation of Kuhn’s
notion of incommensurability, and, consequently, from what could be called artifact
centrism. Due to this heritage, they are unable to grasp innovation processes that cut
across the boundaries of established patterns of technological change. Fleck’s
framework seems to be much more suitable, as it entertains a weak notion of
incommensurability. I shall demonstrate that this makes a Fleckian imagery an
excellent basis to understand innovation of complex and systemic technologies and
some of the organizational challenges around such technologies.
The paper is organized as follows. ‘‘Kuhn and Fleck: a comparison’’ brieﬂy
summarizes Kuhnian ideas of scientiﬁc progress along four propositions, and
explores Fleck’s work in terms of analogies and differences with these propositions.
I demonstrate that Fleck has provided us with a more sophisticated notion of normal
progress, and, associated with it, a more sophisticated reading of incommensura-
bility. In ‘‘Toward a Fleckian perspective on technological change and innovation’’,
I survey Kuhn’s inﬂuence in innovation studies, elaborate a number of advantages
of a Fleckian perspective on innovation, and brieﬂy discuss the phenomenon of
conﬁgurational innovation. Against this background, the concluding section
‘‘Challenging incommensurability’’ develops a number of advantages of a Fleckian
perspective on conﬁgurational innovation, both in terms of intracollective commu-
nication and intercollective communication.
Kuhn and Fleck: A Comparison
Ludwik Fleck’s position as a seminal precursor of the contemporary understanding
of science as a social process is well-established (see Latour 2008 for a recent and
refreshing discussion).
1 However, Fleck’s legacy in technology studies and the
study of technological change and innovation, in particular, is less pronounced, and
1 This is not the place to discuss Fleck’s work and his legacy in contemporary science studies in full.
Both his oeuvre as well as his role as a classic ﬁgure in science studies have been discussed elsewhere:
The special issue in Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences introduced
by Lo ¨wy (2004) is a good entrance point to the immediate discussion about Fleck’s work, and Golinski
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paradigms (see below). To shed light on associated pitfalls and missed opportu-
nities, I compare Fleckian and Kuhnian ideas of scientiﬁc knowledge production in
this section. I demonstrate that, while Kuhn has indeed resembled some of Fleck’s
central ideas, he was reluctant to accept Fleck’s more radical claim that science is an
essentially social process. To delve into this aspect, I start with a brief overview of
Kuhn’s main propositions and then explore a number of differences with Fleck’s
original conceptions.
Thomas Kuhn on Scientiﬁc Paradigms
Thomas Kuhn’s book The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions (SSR) has become one
of the most widely received intellectual contributions to the social sciences.
2 Indeed,
Kuhn’s attempt to do away with positivist, objectivist and universalist notions of
science has engendered a proliﬁc body of empirically based and historically
sensitive ideas about scientiﬁc progress that have extensively been discussed
elsewhere (Fuller 2003 for an overview and starting point). In what follows, I shall
brieﬂy recapitulate Kuhn’s basic ideas along four propositions.
(I) Scientiﬁc knowledge production is fundamentally distinct from other forms of
knowledge production. Indeed, Kuhn distinguishes between pre-paradigmatic
science and paradigmatic science, where the emergence of a paradigm marks the
transition to science proper (see Chapter 2 in SSR). Once a paradigm has emerged,
knowledge production is not the same anymore. Those that adhere to the paradigm
do not, in every step they take, have to rebuild the foundations of ‘‘their’’ ﬁeld of
study.
(II) Normal progress is Kuhn’s term to describe scientiﬁc knowledge production
that is guided by a paradigm (see Chapter 3 in SSR). Kuhn describes the essence of
normal progress as ‘‘mopping-up activities’’—expected solutions are developed to
those problems that are already accepted as such. In this sense, normal progress
allows for a directed, selective and in-depth exploration of a scientiﬁc ﬁeld. First
and foremost—and this is the true innovation of the paradigm concept (SSR: 187)—
paradigms are exemplary solutions that sketch out a pattern for problem solving;
3
these exemplars, in turn, embody tacit norms, theories and rules that mark a
constellation of group commitments. This interplay of concrete problem solutions,
on the one hand, and group commitments, on the other, is at the center of a scientiﬁc
paradigm and thus also of normal science.
Footnote 1 continued
(2005) as well as Smith (2005) provide excellent reviews of Fleck’s inﬂuence in the various branches of
science studies.
2 In what follows, I am referring to the second edition of the SSR that includes the important postscript
(Kuhn 1970).
3 Kuhn’s original book was heavily criticized for its plurivalent and fuzzy use of the term paradigm. Only
in the famous postscript to the second edition of SSR, Kuhn attempted to rectify some of this confusion by
distinguishing between paradigms as group commitments and paradigms as shared exemplars. He
believed the latter to be the more useful and novel aspect of his work (SSR: 187).
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paradigm shifts. In times of normal progress, a paradigm itself remains unaltered as
a framework, while the knowledge produced according to that framework
accumulates. Only after times of crises, when solutions discovered within a
community do not ﬁt with the expectations of a paradigm, a new paradigm may
eventually overturn the existing one. A scientiﬁc revolution occurs. Kuhn’s
conception of scientiﬁc progress thus implies a distinction between paradigms as
more or less constant entities, only altered in times of scientiﬁc revolutions, and the
knowledge accumulated under the guidance of a paradigm.
(IV) Paradigms are shared by knowledge creating communities; normal science
is a collective process. Kuhn himself, however, never fully appreciated the
sociological implications of his work (Harwood 1986; Kuhn 1979), but addressed
the issue of scientiﬁc communities mostly as an empirical problem about the reach
of paradigms. The role scientiﬁc communities play for the process of problem
solving itself has remained strikingly underdeveloped in Kuhn.
One aspect, however, has been clear for Kuhn—scientiﬁc paradigms are
incommensurable. Notwithstanding its strict mathematical sense, Kuhn has used the
notion of incommensurability in a fairly sociological way in SSR to denote that
scientists belonging to different paradigms ‘‘practice their trades in different
worlds’’ (SSR: 150); they are ‘‘always at least slightly at cross-purposes’’ (SSR:
148) and ‘‘bound partly to talk through each other’’ (SSR: 148). Proponents of
different paradigms are thus constrained in their ability to interact in a meaningful
way, and, in SSR, Kuhn suggests that disputes between paradigms can only be
resolved at once, with one of the competing paradigms prevailing. For the Kuhn that
wrote SSR, knowledge production across the boundaries between different
paradigms is difﬁcult, if not impossible, without leaving the realm of science. I
shall call this a strong reading of incommensurability. Much of Kuhn’s later work
on incommensurability, most notably in Kuhn (1982), has shifted the focus toward a
more analytical discussion of incommensurability between theories (not paradigms).
As others have noted before, there are different versions of Kuhnian incommen-
surability (Hoyningen-Huene 1990; Oberheim 2005). In this paper, I conﬁne myself
to incommensurability in the sociologically and empirically sensitive way it was
introduced in SSR (see also Babich 2003: 86n2, for this point).
4 Below, we will see
that this is also the way it has entered discussions about technological change and
innovation.
Ludwik Fleck on Thought Styles and Collectives
In the preface to SSR, Kuhn mentions a 1935 monograph by Ludwik Fleck as an
early inﬂuence that ‘‘anticipates many of my own ideas’’ (SSR: ix). At the time
when Kuhn wrote SSR, Fleck’s book was an almost unknown piece of work that
gained wide attention, partly triggered by Kuhn’s mentioning, only in the 1970s
through the work of Baldamus and a translation into English as Genesis and
4 Incommensurability, as suggested by Kuhn in SSR, is indeed an empirical statement rather than a
nomological one (see Hacking 1983: 69).
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123Development of a Scientiﬁc Fact (Fleck 1979, henceforth: GDSF). For Fleck, the
key idea is that cognition not only involves the individual and some alleged reality,
but, most importantly, the body of prior knowledge shared by a particular group of
individuals. This body of shared knowledge mediates every instance of cognition
and makes knowledge production an essentially social process. Hence, it is the
thought collective, a group of individuals exchanging ideas and thus developing and
nurturing a particular thought style (GDSF: 39), that is pivotal to cognition.
Members of a thought collective struggle to align observations with their thought
style to develop scientiﬁc ‘‘facts’’. Against this background, Fleck calls for a
comparative epistemology (DGSF: 22) that would allow comparing different modes
of knowledge production and different histories of ideas on equal terms. For him,
every thought style is the product of a contingent historical process, where ‘‘the
interaction between what is already known, what remains to be learned, and those
who are to apprehend it’’ (DGSF: 38) leads to a certain constraint on thought
(Denkzwang). Only through this intricate historical process, of which members of a
thought collective are normally not aware, occurrences in a chaotic stream of
observations appear as mere and simple facts, as ‘‘stylized signal[s] of resistance in
thinking’’ (DGSF: 98).
While Fleck’s work indeed bears important similarities with Kuhn’s ideas, it is
Fleck’s radical conception of science as a social process that most clearly sets it
apart from Kuhn. In what follows, I specify associated differences along the lines of
the four propositions discussed above:
(I) According to Fleck, there is no fundamental difference between scientiﬁc and
other forms of knowledge production. On the contrary, for Fleck, the particular
strength of thought collective theory is revealed in its ability to compare very
different forms of knowledge production (DGSF: 46–51). As such, scientiﬁc
thinking is distinct only in style—by a ‘‘postulate ‘to maximize experience’’’
(DGSF: 51) and a typical orientation towards ‘‘maximum thought constraint with
minimum thought caprice’’ (DGSF: 95). Hence, Fleck identiﬁes a general pattern in
the development of scientiﬁc facts, leading from a ‘‘vague initial visual perception’’
to the ‘‘developed direct visual perception of a form’’
5 (DGSF: 92); but this pattern
is neither unique to scientiﬁc facts (although Fleck seems to suggest that it is more
pronounced for them) nor does it distinguish between pre-science and science. This
is an important difference with Kuhn’s conception: paradigms seem to emerge at
relatively distinct points in time, and once they are established, the modus operandi
within the respective community becomes paradigmatic. In this sense, Kuhn
suggests that the emergence of a paradigm is a form of social closure, separating
two qualitatively different modes of collective inquiry. For Fleck, thought styles
continuously change, and eventually they may exert the degree of thought constraint
that characterizes scientiﬁc thinking.
(II) This implies a different conception of scientiﬁc progress by both authors.
Indeed, in Fleck’s work there is no elaborate equivalent to scientiﬁc
5 Note that ‘‘perception of form’’ is the translation of ‘‘Gestaltsehen’’, a translation that masks Kuhn’s
and Fleck’s joint emphasis on gestalt as an important element of paradigms and thought styles,
respectively.
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6 But also the very nature of cumulative scientiﬁc progress differs in
the writings of Kuhn and Fleck. In normal science (Kuhn), the premises of a
paradigm itself remain widely unaltered, only the knowledge that is produced
under its guidance changes. For Fleck, there is no such distinction. A thought
style changes with every instance of cognition, and truth is a network whose
conﬁguration continuously changes as new facts are developed (Smith 2000).
Active and passive connections are the primary concepts Fleck uses to capture
the nature of this continuous change, where active connections denote the
collectively constructed preconditions of cognition, while passive connections
refer to what is experienced as objective reality (DGSF: 40). Scientiﬁc thinking,
according to Fleck, proceeds through increasing both active and passive
connections (DGSF: 83, 94–95). This is similar to Kuhn’s claim that scientiﬁc
progress moves towards detail and depth rather than towards objective truth.
Yet, there still is an essential difference: where Kuhn explains the tenacity of a
paradigm through closure (what is accepted as a problem and expected as a
solution, is established with the emergence of a paradigm), Fleck offers a more
advanced explanation for the tenacity of a thought style—the continuous
reproduction of the interlocking of active and passive linkages within the
intricate network of scientists, experiments, publications, interests, organizations,
and methods. Hence, constraint of thought (in a way, the equivalent to Kuhn’s
puzzle solving) is a result of continuous collective transformations to maintain
and increase such constraint; facts are not just puzzles solved, but created
actively in every instance of cognition. In other words, the ‘‘closedness’’ of
thought styles is a matter of degree, a result of continuous efforts and object to
change rather than absolute once accomplished, only surmountable through a
paradigm shift.
A second difference exists because Fleck does not grant exemplary solutions the
same epistemological status as Kuhn. Fleck does develop the notion of proto-ideas,
i.e. early traces of concepts of contemporary thought styles, but these do not ﬁgure
as central elements at the surface of recent versions of a thought style. In fact, proto-
ideas are valuable because of their heuristic signiﬁcance in the early phases of a
thought collective, but as such, they are hardly able to demonstrate the functioning
of a whole thought style (DGSF: 25)—which is the role Kuhn ascribes to exemplary
artifacts within paradigms (SSR: 187–189).
(III) Most importantly, Fleck’s and Kuhn’s conceptions differ in their speciﬁ-
cations of how a certain balance between stability and change is produced. In fact,
Fleck dedicates wide sections of his monograph, particularly Chapter 4, to this
issue. For him, a ‘‘thought collective exists whenever two or more persons are
actually exchanging thought’’ (DGSF: 102). Of course, such rudimentary versions
of a thought collective, while illustrating well the essence of the concept itself, are
6 Fleck does suggest that the history of comprehensive theories proceeds through eras of classicity,
‘‘when only those facts are recognized that conform to it exactly’’, and eras with complications, ‘‘when
exceptions begin to come forward’’ that may occasionally outnumber normal instances (DGSF: 29).
While this anticipates some ideas that Kuhn uses to describe scientiﬁc revolutions, it is only a sideline
argument of Fleck. This difference is the most obvious between the works of Kuhn and Fleck (see Babich
2003; Harwood 1986).
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account for the kind of intricate thinking that is characteristic of science. However,
such initial groups may grow and persist over time and then the respective thought
style ‘‘becomes ﬁxed and formal in structure’’ (DGSF: 103). According to Fleck,
modern science proceeds in such stable or comparatively stable thought collectives.
With some simpliﬁcation, therefore, Kuhn’s paradigms resemble what Fleck has
described as stable thought styles, but, in this sense, also represent an incomplete
translation of Fleck’s notion. For Fleck, it is an essential feature of thought styles
that their degree of stability is subject to continuous social reproduction.
Stability and change of thought collectives is controlled by the communication of
thought within and between collectives. For Fleck, thought collectives consist of
intersecting circles, ‘‘a small esoteric circle and a larger exoteric circle’’ (DGSF:
105). The esoteric circle, where a thought style’s coercive force is comparably weak
(DGSF: 108), is the primary source of novelty, whereas the communication of
thought between the inner and outer circles of a thought collective (intracollective
communication) accounts for the tenacity of a thought style. What a difference with
Kuhn’s paradigms, which are esoteric circles by deﬁnition and produce novelty by
accident rather than deliberately. But also the communication of thought between
collectives (intercollective communication) constitutes an important source of
novelty for Fleck (DGSF: 109): While he conﬁnes himself to relatively generic
remarks in this regard, he is explicit about the effects of intercollective
communication (DGSF: 109):
Just as the shared mood within a thought collective leads to an enhancement of
thought currency, so does the change in mood during the intercollective
passage of ideas produce an adjustment in this cash value across the entire
range of possibilities, from a minor change in coloration, through an almost
complete change of meaning, to the destruction of all sense (DGSF: 109–110).
Fleck indicates that intercollective communication is both a frequent occurrence
and an important reason for change that ranges from minor adoptions to complete
shifts in the foundations of a thought style. I shall call this a weak notion of
incommensurability.
7 In contrast to Kuhn, Fleck explicitly explored incommensu-
rability as a fruitful tension from which a common ground may jointly be created. In
the context of science, this challenging of incommensurability as a productive
source of innovation has been thoroughly echoed, although not always with explicit
reference to Fleck.
8 The most notable examples are in the concepts of ‘‘boundary
object’’ (Star and Griesemer 1989; Star 1993) and ‘‘trading zone’’ (Galison 1996)
that have been devised to capture the interactions between scientiﬁc communities.
7 It is interesting that Fleck did use the notion of ‘‘incommensurability’’ himself (Fleck 1986), although
not in his original monograph. While his elaboration of the term was sketchy, he did suggest that illnesses
can only be understood in their completeness as a collection of changing and incommensurable ideas,
‘‘irrational in its entirety, [but] rational in its details’’ (Fleck 1986: 43).
8 I am grateful to one anonymous reviewer for directing my attention to the need to make the connections
between Fleck’s intercollective communication and more recent concepts in STS explicit. A further
discussion of intercollective communication in a narrower Fleckian sense can be found in Lo ¨wy (1988),
Sinding (2004) and Fehr (2005).
Challenging Incommensurability 495
123In the context of technological change and innovation, a comparably systematic
treatment of the zones and spaces in which different knowledge communities might
come together is thus far absent. I shall return to this issue below.
Toward a Fleckian Perspective on Technological Change and Innovation
Kuhn’s Legacy in Innovation Studies
The inﬂuence of Kuhn’s ideas of paradigms and revolutions on innovation studies
can roughly be grouped into three streams. The ﬁrst stream, associated primarily
with the sociology of technology, has been built on the assumption that technology,
just as science, can be conceived as a knowledge system. Essentially, then,
technological change is a process of knowledge production that follows structured
patterns similar to those of science. In particular Johnston (1972), and later
Granberg and Stankiewicz (1981), Laudan (1984) and Clark (1987), have explicitly
referred to Kuhn in introducing the notion of technological paradigms:
[…] a technological paradigm is a set of guiding principles generally accepted
by practitioners in a particular ﬁeld of technology. […] there are sets of beliefs
and principles, including relevant scientiﬁc laws. Also subsumed within the
paradigm, but not identical with it, are exemplars. These are models which
demonstrate the functioning and the success of a paradigm. […] Thirdly, there
is the body of techniques, and experiences based on previous practice
(Johnston 1972: 122).
Johnston’s adoption of the Kuhnian prototype has been criticized for establishing
analytical boundaries between technological dynamics and the social matrix in
which it is embedded (Pinch and Bijker 1984; Bijker 1987). Indeed, Johnston’s
work bears deterministic undertones, as the sole focus is on engineers’ mindsets that
push artifacts along the trajectories described by their technological properties. This
critique has somewhat downplayed Johnston’s careful resemblance of Kuhn’s subtle
description of paradigms as guiding, not determining corridors of future change, but
it brings out that Johnston has indeed limited his analysis of technological change to
the work of technologists and engineers.
More interesting, in this regard, is another aspect of his adaptation—in fact an
aspect still present in many contemporary attempts to conceptualize knowledge
practices in technological change: In technological paradigms, technical objects
fulﬁll an equivalent function to scientiﬁc exemplars in Kuhnian paradigms. They
thus play a central role in structuring knowledge practices, and explanations of
technological change have continued to revolve around the involvement with
discrete technical objects. This is pronounced in Bijker’s description of social
closure, where artifacts turn into an obdurate manifestation of the complex struggle
that has led to a dominant interpretation of meaning (1995: 282). But also in
Bucciarelli’s (2002) object worlds, in Vincenti’s (1995) technical shaping of
technology, in Constant’s (1987) communities of practitioners or even in Callon’s
(1986) actor worlds, the question of how and where to locate the practices of
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extent, and ‘‘their’’ technology (Jorgensen and Sorensen 1999; Tuomi 2002). The
point is not that these concepts closely follow Kuhn—in fact, their reference to
Kuhn is often tenuous and built on a fairly critical reﬂection of Kuhnian thought—,
but that Kuhn’s legacy in many contemporary approaches reveals itself in a focus on
more or less well-conﬁned and discrete pieces of technology. It is this artifact
centrism, inherent already in the prototype of scientiﬁc exemplars, that most
pronouncedly characterizes Kuhn’s legacy in innovation studies.
The second approach, which has probably contributed most to the wide and
transdisciplinary popularity of the notion of technological paradigms (see Peine
2008), has been commenced by Dosi’s attempt to put technological paradigms into
an explicitly economic framework (Dosi 1982). Here, the general thread has been to
use Kuhnian ideas to reconcile demand pull and technology push models of
innovation. The search heuristics and routines of technologists are patterned (i.e. the
basis of non-random search activities) and embed information from the demand side
(Nelson and Winter 1977; Sahal 1985; Saviotti 1988). In this sense, Kuhnian ideas
are at the very foundation of what has become known as evolutionary economics
(von Tunzelmann et al. 2008). Also evolutionary economics have adopted Kuhnian
ideas in a metaphorical sense, but, in contrast to their sociological and historical
forerunners, they have pursued a signiﬁcant degree of formalizing the Kuhnian
notion of puzzle solving (van den Belt and Rip 1987).
9 In this connection,
evolutionary economics have carried on an even stronger sense of artifact centrism,
where discrete artifacts are at the heart of structuring the industrial sectors in which
they are embedded (Dosi 1997).
A third approach has used a loose reference to Kuhn to conceptualize the
evolution of industrial sectors and its entanglement with the nature of the underlying
technology. Referring back to the seminal work of Abernathy and Utterback (1978)
on dominant designs, the study of industrial dynamics has distinguished between
different forms of industry evolution in dependence of the degree of technological
standardization. In particular, the emergence of a dominant design has been
identiﬁed as a watershed event that demarcates forms of loose standardization from
a generally accepted strong standardization of core design principles (Anderson and
Tushman 1990; Tushman and Anderson 1986). Although this work has referred to
Kuhn only in passing (and often also indirectly through Dosi’s work on
technological paradigms), the similarities between dominant designs and Kuhnian
paradigms have been emphasized (Anderson and Tushman 1990; Utterback and
Suarez 1993; Teece 1986). The main difference with work in evolutionary
economics is that dominant designs have been explored in terms of the effects they
have on the structure of industries. In line with Kuhnian ideas, dominant designs
have been shown to consolidate industry structures and thus usher in eras of industry
maturity (Utterback and Suarez 1993). But, also very much in the spirit of the
Kuhnian prototype, studies on dominant designs have been struggling to
9 In evolutionary economics, technological problems and its associated trade-offs tend to be seen as
describing somewhat inevitable ‘‘natural’’ trajectories for further change, rather than the results of actions
and interactions of technologists and other social groups (MacKenzie 1992; van den Belt and Rip 1987).
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maturity (Murmann and Frenken 2006).
I have provided a more detailed account of Kuhn’s legacy in various notions of
technological paradigms elsewhere (Peine 2006, 2008). What this brief outline
should demonstrate is that Kuhnian though, while often used in a metaphorical
sense, has left a considerable mark on the study of technological change and
innovation. In the following section, I shall brieﬂy discuss a number of problems
associated with artifact centrism, and prepare the ground for a Fleckian perspective
that can help tackling these problems.
Artifact Centrism and Advantages of a Fleckian Perspective
Kuhn’s inﬂuence in the study of technological change and innovation revolves
around artifact centrism:
10 Artifacts and discrete artifacts, in particular, operate as
analytical markers of the social locale in which patterned forms of technological
change proceed. And for good reason! The Kuhnian prototype, after all, offered
students of technological change a compelling way to conceptualize the inﬂuence of
design decisions on further corridors of progress—regardless of the extent to which
these design decisions are conceptualized as manifestations of a broader social,
cultural, economic or industrial matrix. Hence, Kuhn’s notion of paradigms has
been applied to explain closure and the patterns of cumulative change that emerge
with it. Indeed, it is a strength of the artifact centrism in the approaches above that
they have delved into the interplay of technical decisions and practices of
knowledge production.
Fleck’s work connects well with artifact centrism, as it would acknowledge the
distinct role of specialists and their involvement with a technology as well—an
analytical emphasis that some critics of Kuhnian thought seem to blur too easily
(see Vincenti 1991). As I have argued above, however, granting technologists such a
distinct analytical space is not without difﬁculties, for it bears the risk for explaining
cumulative technological change solely in terms of technical problems. Kuhn’s
heritage, therefore, poses an analytical quandary, as it offers a vocabulary to grasp
patterned forms of cumulative change, while at the same time it has tended to
downplay the contingencies of innovation by masking the embedding of technology
with its broader societal context. A fresh look at Fleck’s sophisticated distinction
between eso- and exoteric circles of thought collectives seems to be helpful in this
regard. It would share with the approaches above the particular strength of granting
technologists and their style of producing knowledge a special position in the
innovation process. But it would be more careful to not exaggerate their inﬂuence
but rather shed light on their speciﬁc position within the intricate interplay of central
and peripheral circles of a thought collective.
This aspect of Fleck’s work—whose fruitfulness in the analysis of technological
change has sparingly been recognized before (Shrum 1984: 79; Bijker 1987:
186n4)—would not in itself break the mold of artifact centrism. The analytical
10 I am indebted to one anonymous reviewer for proposing this label for a central theme in my
argumentation.
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technological change. Where the artifact centrism following from Kuhn’s inﬂuence
has induced analytical boundaries around the change processes associated with
certain pieces of technology (and we might speculate that Kuhn’s particular way of
presenting incommensurability has contributed to this), Fleck’s concept of
intercollective communication suggests ways to put precisely the interplay of
distinct change processes center stage. It is this aspect of the Fleckian prototype, the
combination of intra- and intercollective communication of thought in an
overlapping structure of different thought collectives, that bears the potential to
overcome the explanatory limitations of artifact centrism regarding some recent
changes in the organization of contemporary innovation.
On Conﬁgurational Innovation
In recent years, the rising relevance of Information and Communication Technol-
ogies (ICTs) has led to a proliferation of technological ﬁelds in which artifacts
embedded in different trajectories of change are fused (Peine 2009). Examples at
hand are such disparate ﬁelds as Smart Homes, Tele Care and Tele Health Systems,
Augmented Reality or Computer Supported Cooperative Work. In different
shadings, such systems of technology have been described as
• complex, to highlight technological interdependence between components in
technological systems (Murmann and Frenken 2006; Rosenkopf and Tushman
1998),
• modular, to underpin that interdependence on the component level also leads to
more complex organizational structures in innovation (Baldwin and Clark 2000),
• conﬁgurational, to describe that innovation process increasingly cut across the
knowledge bases of both diverse industrial sectors and the local practices of
users (Fleck 1993, 1994).
In what follows, I focus on this last category of conﬁgurational technologies and
show how they challenge the explanatory power of Kuhn’s heritage in innovation
studies. Conﬁgurational technologies represent an increasing trend for ICT-related
innovative activities to be distributed over disperse technological, organizational
and domestic contexts (Pollock and Williams 2010; Williams et al. 2005; Voss et al.
2010). Rather than being characterized by a well-speciﬁed technological identity,
conﬁgurations are more or less unique implementations of technical systems that
draw on a loosely deﬁned set of components. In a Smart Home, for instance, ICTs
facilitate the interoperability of household product and services, such as white
goods, consumer electronics and building functions, to offer new functionalities. In
TeleCare settings, a speciﬁc conﬁguration of remote care services and monitoring
devices is embedded in the homes and private lives of older persons. It is a peculiar
aspect of such domains that ‘‘their’’ technology remains unspeciﬁed: a conﬁguration
obtains an identity only as local contingencies, such as the everyday practices of
older persons, become conﬁgured with generally available technical knowledge.
Innovation of conﬁgurational technologies thus cuts across a wide range of
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practical knowledge of users, and the ‘‘conﬁgurational’’ knowledge of those
facilitating implementation. This constellation challenges the conventional wisdom
about the locales of innovation, as the evolution of conﬁgurations does not revolve
around a clearly deﬁned technological artifact (Fleck 2002). Innovation of conﬁg-
urational technologies is pluricentric, so to speak, involving a range of artifacts that
often have a history independent of their inclusion into the conﬁguration.
The dynamics of conﬁgurational technologies, therefore, are characterized by
repeated implementations from a certain set of components. Over time, these
dynamics stabilize as more experience accumulates about aspects such as the range
of components from which conﬁgurations draw, the types of functionalities that can
be offered by certain conﬁgurations, or the distribution of proﬁts among the
involved actors. Yet, this does not lead to the articulation of a dominant
conﬁguration, but rather to pluriform identities of various degrees of stability
(Peine 2009). In the Smart Home ﬁeld, for instance, different prototype houses exist,
players have entered the ﬁeld that are specialized in implementing Smart Home
systems, and companies associated with the different components have explored
new business models by offering their previously stand-alone solutions within the
context of systemic solutions. In this constellation, experience is accumulated about
what Smart Homes can offer to its users, how to implement them into different
contexts, or how to proﬁt from these implementations. Nonetheless, Smart Homes
are unlikely to develop a coherent identity that would resemble the kind of closure
implicit to the artifact centrism discussed above. Smart Homes remain inherently
contingent upon the speciﬁc context for which they are conﬁgured. This sustained
‘‘openness’’, in different shadings, is a pivotal feature that characterizes innovation
around conﬁgurational technologies (Williams et al. 2005).
Conceptual tools inspired by Kuhn and the artifact centrism they have given rise
to in different branches of the innovation literature seem to be particularly ill-suited
to deal with this phenomenon. They have focused the attention of researchers on
knowledge generation within certain collectives, while ICT-induced innovation of
conﬁgurational technologies successfully establishes connections between other-
wise separate collectives. In innovation studies, the Kuhn-inspired approaches
discussed above continue to be puzzled by the distributed locales of conﬁgurational
innovation.
Challenging Incommensurability
I have shown that Kuhn’s idea of scientiﬁc paradigms has widely been used as a
metaphor to capture certain characteristics of technological change and innovation:
Technological paradigms—or related concepts such as frames or dominant
designs—have pointed to the punctuated nature of innovation processes, where
closure, in different conceptual speciﬁcations, marks the emergence of patterned,
cumulative change driven by communities of practitioners that tackle the problems
associated with ‘‘their’’ technology. Incommensurability in a Kuhnian sense has
received very little explicit attention by innovation scholars. I contend, though, that
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cumulative technological change as a relatively concealed trajectory revolving
around a well-deﬁned object of technology.
11
Conﬁgurational technologies, where innovation cuts across different spheres of
knowledge production, challenge a strong interpretation of incommensurability.
Quite likely, Kuhn’s positioning of paradigms as entrenched and closed structures
has contributed to a conceptual blind spot in innovation studies in this regard. Kuhn
has provided innovation scholars with a powerful imagery to grasp innovation in
terms of articulating better generally available solutions. This imagery, however, is
misleading in the light of systemic solutions that draw on the local contingencies to
which they are adapted. I posit that Fleck’s concepts of thought styles and
collectives provide a more suitable imagery to grasp the salient features of
conﬁgurational innovation—an imagery that retains the strong aspects of Kuhn-
inspired metaphors, while also expanding their explanatory power. I shall elaborate
upon this along the lines of intracollective and intercollective communication.
Intracollective Communication in Technological Change and Innovation
For Fleck, an essential feature of knowledge generation is that it proceeds in
overlapping eso- and exoteric circles of a collective. As such, the idea of thought
collectives provides interesting cues to complement notions like technological
paradigms. Most importantly, Fleck’s concepts delve deeper into the varied internal
structure of the locales that drive change. Like Kuhn’s prototype, also Fleck’s
prototype allows for conceptualizing stable patterns of change within (more or less)
coherent groups. Fleck’s ideas comprise those of Kuhn in the sense that they also
allow for adopting a vocabulary of closure and related cumulative change. In fact,
Fleck’s description of stable and mature thought collectives correspondents well to
Kuhnian paradigms, so that a Fleckian perspective on technological change includes
what has been described as technological paradigms, frames or dominant design. I
believe that this is a crucial and hitherto underrated aspect. Innovation is both
contingent and structured, and previous approaches, often in examination of Kuhn’s
legacy, have tended to emphasize either of these aspects (for this point, see Russell
and Williams 2002). But technological progress neither exclusively thrives on
solving technological problems, nor is it endlessly contingent. Fleck’s rich
description of the social production of stability and change through intracollective
communication provides a middle ground, in this regard, which is sensitive to the
pivotal role of materiality in a non-reductionist way. For him, new knowledge is
produced in esoteric circles of specialists—so far: in accordance with Kuhn’s
legacy—but the degree to which the mindset of this circle inﬂuences change en
large depends on its entanglement with various exoteric circles. Conceiving of
technological communities and their involvement with a technology as a thought
11 The only explicit treatment of Kuhnian incommensurability in innovation studies known to me is Dew
(2006). His discussion of ‘‘incommensurate technological paradigms’’ indeed resembles closely the
strong incommensurability that Kuhn suggests in parts of his work.
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inputs of technologists, policy makers, users, and other players in innovation.
For Fleck, closure is a matter of degree rather than a tipping point. Passive
and active couplings play a pivotal role here, when scientists strive to
maximize thought constraint—that what appears within a thought style as
objective fact. Thought constraint, I believe, is a fruitful metaphor to capture
the role of artifacts in technological thought collectives as pieces of knowledge
about technological functionality that have been proven to work. Technological
artifacts, just as in the perspectives inspired by Kuhn, would remain at the
heart of technological communities. But their role within these communities
would not parallel the exemplary solutions in a Kuhnian sense that lay down a
well-deﬁned agenda of problems to be solved. Rather, their functioning would
correspond to that of proto-ideas in the Fleckian sense. That is, they contain a
basis for further articulation to which different circles of a collective can
relate. Jointly, then, these proto-ideas are further articulated through intracol-
lective communication until they may obtain a degree of stability that makes
them similar to Kuhn’s exemplars (DGSF: 29). This is an aspect of Fleck’s
work developed by Oudshoorn (1994) in her ‘‘archaeology’’ of sex hormones:
proto-ideas are a basis for further development; but they remain open for the
inputs of a diverse set of specialisms. In that sense, artifacts in a Fleckian
imagery constitute ‘‘boundary objects’’ (Star 1993) that facilitate heteroge-
neous problem solving and crystallize the knowledge inputs from diverse
specialisms.
Such a reading of artifacts as proto-ideas that provide initial ‘‘signals of
resistance’’ is particularly relevant for understanding how different degrees of
closure are realized, perpetuated and (re-)opened. Artifacts, indeed, embark on
their innovation journey as initial propositions from a circle of specialists, but
then they meander among different sites where they incorporate and structure the
inputs of various actors. In a Fleckian perspective, initial design propositions
become re-deﬁned, enriched and increasingly obdurate, as they are ‘‘communi-
cated’’ within the overlapping circles of designers, users, marketing departments,
policy makers, and others. This connects very well with the burgeoning literature
in technology studies about the entanglement of use and design in innovation (for
an overview, see Oudshoorn and Pinch 2008). This literature, often through
employing the metaphor of a script (Akrich 1992; Akrich and Latour 1992), has
focused on how the inputs of users and designers mutually condition each other as
they are inscribed in technical objects. Much of this literature, however, has
pursued micro-level case studies and is thus bounded to speciﬁc local contexts.
An imagery of thought styles and collectives would add to this a diachronic
dimension to enlighten how initial designs become re-deﬁned, enriched and
stable as they travel through different circles involved with their production and
use. Substituting for and complementing the imagery of technological paradigms
with an imagery of thought styles and collectives, to delve deeper into the
heterogeneous structure of technological communities, may be a very fruitful
‘‘classical’’ underpinning of the emerging vocabulary of design-use relations (see
Hyysalo 2009).
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What is said in the previous section is neither completely new in technology
studies—although, I believe, it offers a refreshing look at some underdeveloped
cues provided by Fleck about technological change—nor does it break the mold of
artifact centrism, yet. The advantages of capturing the entrenched and collective
processes of technological change in a Fleckian imagery become particularly
compelling in the context of conﬁgurational innovation. Here, not only intracol-
lective communication, but also intercollective communication is a salient feature.
As elaborated above, conﬁgurations evolve in pluricentric ﬁelds that comprise a
range of artifacts that are assembled into systems in the light of local contingencies.
Artifact centrism is a conceptual limitation in this regard, and Fleck’s description of
intercollective communication and the associated weak reading of incommensura-
bility provide interesting complements. For Fleck, incommensurability between
thought collectives constitutes an obstacle, but one that not only can be overcome,
but that is frequently overcome and, then, constitutes an important sources of
novelty. A Fleckian imagery, therefore, readily addresses pluricentric situations that
comprise various and overlapping thought collectives with different gravity centers
and degrees of closure.
We should grasp conﬁgurational innovation in terms of overlapping thought
collectives with various centers. Such a reading would be empirically sensitive to
the diversity of locales in which different types of knowledge are generated. Most
importantly, it would acknowledge the mature and stable thought collectives at
the component level—conﬁgurations, after all, link existing artifacts into a
system—and focus on their relations with emerging, initially volatile thought
collectives at the level of the conﬁgurational ﬁeld. This ﬁeld level comprises test
or research sites to implement certain versions of a conﬁguration, new services
specialized in ‘‘conﬁguring’’, or the development of new strategies for the
commercial roll-out of conﬁgurations. These aspects, however, add to already
existing and, to a certain degree, entrenched practices at the component level.
Knowledge about conﬁgurational technologies, therefore, initially accumulates in
an unstable and volatile structure in which members of different thought
collectives start exploring the emerging conﬁgurational ﬁeld. Intercollective
communication is an essential feature of this delicate structure, which evolves,
stabilizes, and links up to the ‘‘participating’’ collectives, while closure is
perpetually protracted. Fleck’s rich description of the social structure of thought
collectives in modern science provides a vocabulary to theorize this peculiar
organizational form of innovation properly.
Again, the idea of proto-ideas seems to be most valuable. Speciﬁc conﬁgurations,
regardless of their degree of stability, are ill-suited to fulﬁll the conceptual position
of exemplary solutions in a Kuhnian sense. They do not represent a sufﬁciently
generic deﬁnition of the technology. Conceiving of conﬁgurations as proto-ideas,
susceptible to continuous re-deﬁnition and reﬁnement, however, offers more
productive conceptual inroads to the dynamics of conﬁgurational technologies.
Their initial signals of resistance would mean different things in different thought
collectives, but this would be a basis for a robust reﬁnement rather than a deﬁnite
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to the different perspectives involved in conﬁgurational innovation, to the different
communities contributing to its development, and to the social production of
tenacity and change in the pluricentric conﬁgurational ﬁelds. No need for a
conceptual equivalent of an exemplary solution. Rather, heterogeneity, pluricen-
tricity, negotiated degrees of stability, sustained openness and related terms would
populate the conceptual landscape. In this sense, a Fleckian imagery successfully
breaks down the conceptual boundaries that the Kuhnian heritage has drawn around
the innovation trajectories of speciﬁc artifacts.
In science studies, incommensurability has been challenged before—establishing
Fleck on the map of innovation scholars thus also suggests tapping into the more
‘‘Fleckian’’ approaches in science studies. That is, to acknowledge that conﬁgu-
rational innovation resembles some features of ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’. Exploring
further such ideas as ‘‘boundary objects’’ (Star 1993) or ‘‘trading zones’’ (Galison
1996) in the context of technological change and innovation may thus greatly
illuminate our understanding of conﬁgurational innovation, how different industrial
sectors come to grips with joint innovation trajectories, and how they continuously
incorporate the local knowledge of users into innovation. While this is beyond the
scope of the present paper, it emphasizes that a Fleckian imagery grasps nicely a
number of pivotal yet under-researched aspects of contemporary innovation that is
driven by the pervasive spread of ICTs.
Conclusions
This paper has explored Ludwik Fleck’s conceptual framework and its potential
value for the analysis of technological change and innovation. For this purpose, it
has examined a number of differences that exist with Kuhn’s ideas about scientiﬁc
progress that have been so inﬂuential in the study of innovation. Fleck’s work, while
widely regarded as a seminal precursor in science studies, has thus far only received
scarce attention by students of technological change and innovation. This is
particularly unfortunate because it has left a number of interesting conceptual
avenues unexplored that this early scholar of collective knowledge production has
developed. I have demonstrated that, in the context of studying innovation, Fleck’s
conceptualization of intracollective communication combines the well-known
advantages of the Kuhnian legacy in notions like technological paradigms and
normal technological progress with a more sophisticated description of the social
production of stability and change. For Fleck, closure is not a tipping point, but
rather gradual, sustained and established within an overlapping structure of eso- and
exoteric circles of a though collective. Conceptualizing the thought collectives that
drive innovation would thus carefully distinguish between the inﬂuences of such
diverse actors as technologists, users, regulators, lobby groups, and so forth. In this
regard, differentiating between eso- and exoteric circles and their respective
contributions to innovation would be a particular strength in overcoming the
limitations of both technological and social determinist accounts of technological
change.
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however, comes to the fore in the context of contemporary ICT-induced innovation.
I have brieﬂy elaborated upon the phenomenon of conﬁgurational innovation, where
different trajectories of technological change are interwoven and evolve simulta-
neously. Fleck’s graded notion of closure together with his weak idea of
incommensurability allows for conceptualizing conﬁgurational innovation in terms
of stable thought collectives of the component knowledge and emerging, yet
initially fragile thought collectives that overarch them. As such, Fleck’s thought
collective theory provides a unique and truly sociological basis for the analysis of
conﬁgurational innovation.
Should we, then, develop a truly Flecki a na p p r o a c ht ou n d e r s t a n dc o n t e m p o -
rary innovation? After all, Fleck never meant his theory to be applied to the
analysis of technological change; furthermore, the idea of intercollective
communication is rather sketchily available in his original work. What I propose
in this paper, therefore, is more modest. I have tried to ﬂesh out how an imagery
using Fleck’s ideas such as thought collectives and proto-ideas fruitfully
complements current approaches in innovation studies that draw on metaphors
derived from Kuhn. Especially, Kuhn’s rather vague and ambivalent reading of
incommensurability in SSR has had some unfortunate following in the form of
what I have denoted as artifact centrism. An imagery based on thought collective
theory is able to overcome a number of associated limitations. Innovation scholars
should thus integrate a thorough reading of Fleck, not as a contemporary
approach, but as a seminal classic, into their repertoire. Above, I have discussed
F l e c k ’ sw o r kt os o m ed e t a i la n dt h a ts e c t i o np r o v i d e sa ni n t r o d u c t i o nt oh i sw o r k
for those not yet familiar with it. Acknowledging Fleck’s fruitful conceptual cues
should also direct the attention of innovation scholars to Fleckian approaches in
science studies that have challenged incommensurability. Exploring these
approaches may very well be most fruitful in coming to grips with some salient
features of conﬁgurational innovation.
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